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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.

:

DANIEL L. CARTER,

:

Case No. 20051149-CA

:

Defendant is incarcerated.

Defendant/Appellant.

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a3(2)(e) (2002). The Honorable Judge, Leslie A. Lewis, Third District Court, Salt Lake
County, Utah entered a judgment of conviction for Tax Evasion—Intent to Evade (tax
evasion), a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-1101(l)(d)
(Supp. 2003), and Tax Evasion—Filing a False or Fraudulent Return or Statement (filing
a false tax return), a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-81101(l)(c) (Supp. 2003), on November 18, 2005.l See Addendum A (Sentence,
Judgment, and Commitment).

1

This brief cites to the 2003 version of section 76-8-1101. Section 76-8-1101 was
amended once during the charged years, on July 1, 2001, but the amendment does not
affect this appeal.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES, STANDARDS OF REVIEW, AND PRESERVATION
L Issue Presented by Standby Counsel:2
Issue 1: Whether the trial court erred in denying Carter's proposed jury
instruction (instruction 50) which explained the relevant law in relation to his defense.
Standard of Review: Whether the trial court's refusal to give a proposed
jury instruction constitutes error is a question of law to be reviewed for correctness. State
v. Smith, 2003 UT App 179,18, 72 P.3d 692, cert denied, 84 P.3d 239 (Utah 2003).
Preservation: This issue is preserved. R. 274:74-79.
II. Issues Presented by the Pro-Se Defendant (see supra note 2, herein):
Issue 2: Whether the trial court erred in denying Carter's proposed jury
instructions which explained the relevant law in relation to his defense.
Standard of Review: Whether the trial court's refusal to give a proposed jury

2

The trial court appointed Salt Lake Legal Defender Association ("LDA") to serve as
standby counsel for Daniel Carter, while he represented himself in the criminal
proceedings. (See infra "Statement of the Case," herein.) LDA continues to represent
Carter in that capacity. See State v. Bakalov, 1999 UT 45, ^15,16, 979 P.2d 799 (an
accused may defend him- or herself in criminal proceedings, including on appeal); see
also Myers v. Johnson, 76 F.3d 1330, 1333-34 (5th Cir. 1996) (recognizing a state
criminal defendant's constitutional right to present pro se briefs and motions on appeal);
State v. Rudolph, 970 P.2d 1221 (Utah 1998). In that capacity, LDA has raised one issue
on appeal, which is identified as the issue and argument of "Standby Counsel." The
manner in which LDA and Carter have proceeded with this brief in presenting Carter's
pro se issues and arguments "comports with sound and fair procedure" and the rules of
procedure. See State v. Clayton, 639 P.2d 168, 170 (Utah 1981); Utah R. App. P. 24.
Moreover, this approach is appropriate, as an Anders brief is inapplicable here
because standby counsel has not reached the conclusion that "an indigent client's appeal
is without merit." Clayton, 639 P.2d at 169; Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744
(1967); see also State v. Smith, 2003 UT App 179,^|6 n.3, 72 P.3d 692 (approving this
procedure as an appropriate channel to present both pro se and standby counsel issues as
long as the brief comports with the rules).
2

instruction constitutes error is a question of law to be reviewed for correctness. Smith,
2003UTAppl79at^|8.
Preservation: This issue is preserved. R. 274:73-82.
Issue 3: Whether the trial court erred in denying Carter's pre-trial motion to
dismiss which argued that because Carter had no income for federal income tax purposes,
he had no income for state income tax purposes either, and therefore he had no income
tax liability under Utah law.
Standard of Review: Whether the trial court erred in denying a pre-trial motion to
dismiss is a question of law to be reviewed for correctness. State v. Marshall 2003 UT
App 381,1(8, 81 P.3d 775, cert denied, 90 P.3d 1041 (Utah 2004).
Preservation: This issue is preserved. R. 273.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
The text of the following is in Addendum B:
U.S. Const, amend. XIV - Due Process of Law;
Utah Const. Art. I, § 7 - Due Process of Law;
Utah Code Ann. § 59-10-112 (2004) - Definition of State Taxable Income;
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-1101 (Supp. 2003) - Tax Evasion; Filing False Return.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Daniel L. Carter ("Carter") was charged by amended criminal information with
one count of filing a false tax return, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code
Ann. § 76-8-1101(l)(c) (Supp. 2003), and one count of tax evasion, a second degree
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-1101(l)(d) (Supp. 2003). R. 240-41. The

3

trial court appointed LDA to represent Carter in the matter. R. 9-10; 16. However, the
trial court ruled Carter could represent himself in the proceedings and appointed LDA to
serve as standby counsel to Carter in the case. R. 273:3. Carter filed a motion to dismiss
on April 21, 2005. R. 69-76. Following a hearing on April 22, 2005, the trial court
denied Carter's motion. R. 69-76; 273.
On June 27, 2005, the trial court commenced a jury trial in the matter. R. 274. In
his opening statement, Carter said the jury should acquit him because "state taxable
income means federal taxable income" and the prosecution could not show he "made
federal taxable income." R. 274:19-20. In his closing argument, Carter again stated
"state tax return is totally based on the federal tax return," and argued the jury should
acquit him because he "simply filed returns reporting [his] state taxable income to be the
same amount as [his] federal taxable income as Utah law requires." Id. at 168-69.
Following deliberations, the jury found Carter guilty as charged. R. 242-43; 274:174.
Thereafter, on November 18, 2005, the trial judge sentenced Carter to an indeterminate
term not to exceed five years in the Utah State Prison for the filing a false tax return
count and an indeterminate term of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years in
the Utah State Prison for the tax evasion count. R. 249-51; 275. The prison sentences
were ordered to run concurrently. Id. The trial court also ordered Carter to pay $10,125
in restitution, a $400 recoupment fee, and a $2,500 fine plus interest and surcharge. Id.
Carter filed a timely notice of appeal. R. 256. He is challenging the rulings of the lower
court as they relate to the trial proceedings.

4

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The state charged Carter with tax crimes under sections §§ 76-8-1101 (l)(c) and
1101(l)(d). R. 2-5. Carter filed a motion to dismiss with the trial court on April 21,
2005. R. 69-76. In the motion to dismiss, Carter argued he had not failed to render
proper tax returns for 2000, 2001, 2002, and 2003 because returns were prepared and
received by the commission. Id at 70-71. Additionally, he asserted he is not liable for
state income taxes since, according to his interpretation of the law, state tax liability is
dependent upon federal tax liability, and he in fact had no federal tax liability. Id. at 71.
Second, Carter argued he is not liable for federal or state income taxes because the
federal tax code does not contain a liability section for assessment or payment of federal
income taxes. I d Consequently, he maintained that because the federal tax code lacks a
liability section, he is not liable for federal income taxes. Id Third, Carter argued he
made no income as defined by the United States Supreme Court. He maintains that
income is strictly defined as a corporate gain or profit. Id at 72. As a result, he argued
that because he does not make a corporate gain or profit and he is not incorporated, his
wages do not constitute income for income tax purposes. Id Finally, Carter argued he
lacked the necessary intent to be charged with tax evasion. Id at 74-75.
The trial court conducted a motion hearing regarding Carter's motion to dismiss
on April 22, 2005. R. 86-93. The trial court did not have the motion to dismiss in its
possession until the motion hearing and did not read the motion before ruling, but instead
ruled solely on Carter's articulated rationale at the motion hearing. R. 273:6. The trial
court denied Carter's motion to dismiss and the matter was set for a jury trial with Carter
5

continuing to represent himself in a pro se capacity with appointed counsel continuing on
as standby counsel. R. 273; 274.
The jury trial was held on June 27, 2005. R. 274. At trial, the State's witness
conceded on cross-examination that the Utah Code "says, 'The state taxable income in
the case of a resident individual means his federal taxable income5"; and that a person
cannot, "according to Utah law, have state taxable income" if he "has no federal taxable
income." R. 274:97.
Carter submitted several requested jury instructions to the trial court. R. 112-121.
Relevant to this appeal, he submitted an instruction that read:
In order to convict the defendant of the charge, the offenses charged in the
Information, the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that:
1. The defendant was liable for paying income taxes; and
2. During the relevant time period the defendant made state taxable
income and not just wages. Unless the prosecution can demonstrate that
all wages are taxable income.
R. 113; 274:73. The trial court refused to give this instruction. R. 274:73. The next
instruction submitted by Carter, labeled by the trial court as instruction 50, stated:
You are instructed that under Utah law that state taxable income in the case
of a resident individual means his federal taxable income. Since Utah law
also requires the reporting of federal income, reported on Federal Form TC40 as the taxpayer's state taxable income, it is essential that the prosecution
prove that the defendant made federal taxable income.
R. 114; 274:74.
The trial court requested the state's position on instruction 50 to which the state
responded:
Mr. Baer: I object because we have already heard testimony that's not the
fact and that's not the state of the law.

6

The Court: I can't hear you.
Mr. Baer: I'm sorry. It's not the state of the law. Independent obligation
under State versus Smith and State versus Jensen both cases, I have copies
for the Court if the Court wishes, very, very, clearly states in both of these,
they're the seminal cases here, that filing a federal return is not a
prerequisite to a Utah obligation.
The Court: All right. I'm not giving 50, it's denied.
R. 274:74-75.
Standby counsel then proffered the following about instruction 50:
Mr. Sikora: Again, Mr. Carter, I believe, is not - - the argument there is it's
federal taxable income that has to be shown that he owed, not that he filed a
federal tax return. And I think that's the distinction that he would make,
that income is not the tax return, that this instruction doesn't have anything
to do with having previously filed a tax return, a federal tax return as a
predicate or a prerequisite to filing a state taxable income, a state tax return.
That's not what he's saying.
The Court: I don't understand what you're saying. Could you give me one
more shot at it.
Mr. Sikora: If I heard correctly, Mr. Baer - The Court: Mr. Baer I think mischaracterized it. But what do you think it
really says?
Mr. Sikora: What I believe that instruction say[s] [sic] is that Carter
actually has to owe, or has to have adjusted gross income on his federal
taxes to pay federal taxes and that's what the prerequisite is to filing his - to not filing a state tax return but paying state taxes.
Trial Court: Okay.
Mr. Sikora: Because of the fact that you have to put your adjusted income
from your federal income tax return on your state income tax return.
The Court: All right. I understand. I am not giving it. Obviously, he
chose not to file a correct federal tax return. That doesn't relieve him of the
burden of filing a proper state tax return.
Id at 75-76.
Finally, the trial court and Carter had the following additional discussion
concerning instruction 50:
Mr. Carter: Your Honor, if I had filed an—If I had filed improper federal
tax return, they have had six years to take—
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The Court: They'll be after you, sir, after. You can't argue that—
Mr. Carter: Six years.
The Court: You cannot argue that. If you think for one minute that you
can say that you are not going to pay federal income tax and it's not going
to come due and owing, you're mistaken.
Mr. Carter: If I'm not liable for federal income tax?
The Court: Why would you not be liable?
Mr. Carter: Because there's no liability section in the Internal Revenue
Code.
The Court: Why is everybody else liable for paying taxes and you not?
Mr. Carter: I could show you the liability section for every tax in this code
except for the—if you—
The Court: You tell me.
Mr. Carter: —taxes, Your Honor.
The Court: What is the basis for you saying you don't owe federal income
tax when everybody else does?
Mr. Carter: Everybody else doesn't if they are not liable under the—
The Court: Well, when the rest of us are paying on our wages, why don't
you have to pay it?
Mr. Carter: I'm following the tax code.
The Court: Why? Tell me why. Why you don't have to pay federal taxes?
Mr. Carter: Because I am not liable for them and the Supreme Court are
telling us—
The Court: Why are you not liable for them?
Mr. Carter: Because I don't make income for income tax purposes. The
Supreme Court, Your Honor—
The Court: What do you mean, you don't make income for income tax
purposes?
Mr. Carter: The Supreme Court has determined that income means a
corporate profit for income tax purposes.
The Court: That's not the law. In fact, if you have a case you can show it
to me.
Mr. Carter: I do, a few of them.
The Court: Well, let's see it.
Mr. Carter: In Merchants versus—
The Court: I want to see the case.
Mr. Carter: Well, I don't have the complete case but I—
The Court: Well, then it's not helpful to me. No, if it's not the complete
case, it's not helpful. You can read the name of the case into the record,
you can summarize what you believe the case says. What's the name of the
case? What do you believe it says?
Mr. Carter: In Merchants Loan & Trust versus Utonka, 255 US 509, at
pages 518 and 519, the Court held that, quote: The word income must be
8

given the same meaning in all of the income tax acts of Congress, those
given to it in the Corporation Excise Tax Act of 1909. There's other court
cases, Your Honor, that talk about income meaning the corporate profit as
in (inaudible).
Id. at 76-79. Concluding "[ijncome is not limited to a corporate profit," the trial court
again refused to give instruction 50. Id. at 79.
Carter also submitted instruction 52, which read:
In order to convict the defendant of tax evasion, the prosecution must show
that the defendant knew he was liable for payment of state income taxes,
but sought to "intentionally evade" paying them.
R. 117; 274:79-80. The State argued this instruction should be rejected because "the term
knew . . . sort of lofts" this instruction "into a good faith defense, what he knew." R.
274:80. "And he is not entitled to a good faith defense under State versus Smith and a
number of other cases. I think the prosecution has to show that the defendant was liable
for the payment of state income taxes but intentionally evade[d] paying it, that goes to the
mens rea element of intent." Id The trial court denied this instruction because it was
already covered as "one of the elements" of tax evasion. Id.
At the close of trial, standby counsel renewed the defense's "exceptions that we've
already made on the instructions that you have denied." R. 274:139. The trial court then
instructed the jury and read the following instruction twice, as instructions 26 and 27:
Tax liability arises from the earning of income and not from the assessment
of tax liability by the federal government. The duty to file a federal return
is not a predicate element of either state income tax evasion or the willful
failure to file a state income tax return.
R. 222 223; 274:155. Following deliberation, the jury convicted Carter of both charges.
R. 236-237. This appeal follows.

9

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT PRESENTED BY STANDBY COUNSEL
A defendant has the right to present his or her theory of the case to the jury and to
have the jury instructed accordingly. Thus, a trial court abuses its discretion by rejecting
an instruction proposed by a defendant unless the instruction incorrectly states the law,
has no reasonable basis in the evidence, or is properly covered in other instructions. In
this case, this Court should reverse because the trial court abused its discretion by
refusing to give instruction 50.
First, instruction 50 accurately described the law because state taxable income is
defined by statute as federal taxable income with modifications, subtractions, and
adjustments. Second, instruction 50 had a reasonable basis in the evidence because
Carter rested his defense on his belief that he did not owe state income tax because state
taxable income is calculated based on federal taxable income and, according to his
interpretation of the federal tax code, he did not make any federal taxable income. Third,
instruction 50 was not properly covered by the instructions given because none of the
instructions given explained to the jury that state taxable income is calculated based on
federal taxable. Moreover, this Court should reverse because the trial court's refusal to
give instruction 50 prejudiced Carter by insufficiently advising the jury of the law,
thereby misleading the jury as to the merits of Carter's defense.

10

ARGUMENT PRESENTED BY STANDBY COUNSEL3
I.

THIS COURT SHOULD REVERSE BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT
ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT REFUSED TO GIVE
REQUESTED JURY INSTRUCTION 50 AND THIS RESULTED IN
PREJUDICIAL ERROR

"Under the due process provisions of the Utah and federal constitutions, a
'"defendant [is] afforded a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.'""
State v.Anderson, 2004 UT App 129, 2004 WL 1368332, *1 (citing State v. Garcia, 965
P.2d 508, 516 (Utah Ct. App. 1998); California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 485 (1984)).
Specifically, due process guarantees a "defendant has the right to present his or her
theory of the case to the jury and to have the jury instructed accordingly." State v.
Bluff, 2002 UT 66,1f21, 52 P.3d 1210, cert, denied, 537 U.S. 1172 (2003). "Failure to
give" a requested jury instruction constitutes reversible error if omission of the
instruction "tends to mislead the jury to the prejudice of the complaining party or
insufficiently or erroneously advises the jury on the law." State v. Stringham, 2001 UT
App 13,1(17, 17 P.3d 1153 (citation omitted).
In this case, this Court should reverse because the trial court abused its discretion
when it refused to give Carter's requested jury instruction 50 and the trial court's abuse
of discretion resulted in prejudicial error.
A.

THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY REJECTING
PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTION 50, WHICH EXPLAINED THAT IN
ORDER TO SHOW INCOME TAX LIABILITY THE PROSECUTION HAD TO
PROVE CARTER ACTUALLY MADE FEDERAL TAXABLE INCOME.
"A defendant has the right to present his or her theory of the case to the jury and to

3

See supra note 2, herein.
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have the jury instructed accordingly." Bluff, 2002 UT 66 at <fl21. He also has the right to
have his "'theory of the case presented to the jury in a clear and understandable way.'"
State v. Alonzo, 932 P.2d 606, 615 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (citation omitted), aff d on other
grounds, 973 P.2d 975 (Utah 1998). A defendant does not, however, "have the right to
improperly instruct the jury," Bluff, 2002 UT 66 at <pi; or to give an instruction "which
c

does not comport with the facts presented or does not accurately state the applicable

law.5" Salt Lake City v. Smoot, 921 P.2d 1003, 1008 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) (citation
omitted), cert, denied, 925 P.2d 963 (Utah 1996). Moreover, "'a defendant is not entitled
to an instruction which is redundant or repetitive of principles enunciated in other
instructions given to the jury.'" State v. Parker, 2000 UT 51,^19, 4 P.3d 778 (citation
omitted). Accordingly, a trial court does not abuse its discretion by rejecting an
instruction proposed by the defendant "where the instruction incorrectly states the law,"
Bluff, 2002 UT 66 at *|21 (citations omitted); has no "reasonable basis in the evidence,"
State v. Dumas, 721 P.2d 502, 506 (Utah 1986); or "is properly covered in other
instructions," Bluff, 2002 UT 66 at ^21 (citations omitted). In this case, the trial court
abused its discretion by refusing to give instruction 50.
First, instruction 50 accurately described the law. The Utah Code defines state
taxable income as "federal taxable income . . . with modifications, subtractions, and
adjustments provided in Section 59-10-114." Utah Code Ann. § 59-10-112 (2004).4 In
other words, if a person has no federal taxable income then, by default, he also has no
4

The 2004 version of Utah Code Ann. § 59-10-112 is cited in this brief. No amendments
were made to this section during the charged years. This section was amended in 2006;
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state taxable income. See Jensen v. State Tax Comm'n, 835 P.2d 965, 969 (Utah 1992)
("The [Utah] Code imposes a tax on a Utah resident's federal taxable income with certain
adjustments." (citing Utah Code Ann. §§ 59-14A-5, -11 (1974); §§ 59-10-104, -112
(1987)).5 In fact, at trial, the State's witness conceded a person cannot, "according to
Utah law, have state taxable income" if he "has no federal taxable income." R. 274:97.
In instruction 50, Carter simply requested an instruction explaining this legal concept:
"You are instructed that under Utah law," because a person's "taxable income . . . means
his federal taxable income," the prosecution is required to "prove that the defendant made
federal taxable income." R. 114; 274:74. If the trial court believed the instruction did
not clearly state this legal concept, as implied by the colloquy preceding its rejection of
the instruction, then it should have offered another instruction that would have more
clearly explained the legal concept. See Alonzo, 932 P.2d at 615.
Second, instruction 50 had a reasonable basis in the evidence. In this case, Carter
filed returns for each of the charged years. R. 274:23-24, 40-46. In these returns, he
reported he did not owe any state income tax because he did not make any federal taxable
income. Id He also attached a page from his federal tax return to each of his state tax
returns, purporting to demonstrate his lack of federal taxable income. Id Then, at trial,
Carter rested his defense on his belief that he did not owe state income tax because state
taxable income is calculated based on federal taxable income and he did not make any
federal taxable income. R. 274:19-20, 58-63, 96-100, 110, 118, 120-21, 167-69.
however, this amendment does not affect Carter's analysis.
5
The statutory language quoted by Jensen remains substantively the same. See, e.g. Utah

n

Regardless of the jury's ultimate conclusion as to whether Carter was correct in his
assertion that he did not make any federal taxable income, it should have been instructed
that the first prong of Carter's defense, that state income tax is calculated from federal
taxable income, was correct. See Jensen, 835 P.2d at 969. By not providing such an
instruction, the trial court left the jury free, if it chose, to inappropriately count Carter's
claim that a person does not owe state income tax if he makes no federal taxable income
as evidence that Carter was attempting to evade a tax by misstating the law. See supra at
Part. LB.
Third, instruction 50 was not properly covered by the instructions given. None of
the instructions given explained to the jury that state taxable income is defined as "federal
taxable income . . . with modifications, subtractions, and adjustments." Utah Code Ann. §
59-10-112. Rather, the jury was instructed twice, in instructions 26 and 27, that "[t]ax
liability arises from the earning of income and not from the assessment of tax liability by
the federal government. The duty to file a federal return is not a predicate element of
either state income tax evasion or the willful failure to file a state income tax return." R.
222 223; 274:155. It is true "the duty to file a federal tax return is not a predicate element
of either state income tax evasion, or the willful failure to file a state income tax return."
Smith, 2003 UT App 179 at «|25. In other words, the State is not required to prove the
defendant "was required to file a federal income tax return for [the charged year]." Id. at
<|24. However, this does not change the legal reality that the Utah Code calculates state
taxable income based on "a Utah resident's federal taxable income with certain
Code Ann. § 59-10-112 (2004).
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adjustments." Jensen, 835 P.2d at 969. The added emphasis of instructing the jury twice
that the duty to file a federal tax return is irrelevant to tax evasion and failure to file,
combined with the lack of an instruction informing the jury that state taxable income is
calculated from federal taxable income, left the false impression that federal taxable
income is irrelevant to calculating state taxable income. Id.; R. 222 223; 274:155.
Accordingly, the trial court abused its discretion by rejecting instruction 50
because the absence of instruction 50 resulted in Carter's defense not being presented to
the jury in a "clear and understandable way." Alonzo, 932 P.2d at 615. In fact, the
absence of instruction 50 served to undermine Carter's defense by allowing the jury to
falsely conclude Carter's assertion that state taxable income is calculated from federal
taxable income was untrue and served as evidence that Carter was trying to evade taxes
by misstating the law. See supra at Part LB.
B.

THIS COURT SHOULD REVERSE BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT'S
REFUSAL TO GIVE INSTRUCTION 50 PREJUDICED CARTER'S CASE.
"Failure to give requested jury instructions constitutes reversible error only if

their omission tends to mislead the jury to the prejudice of the complaining party or
insufficiently or erroneously advises the jury on the law.'" Stringham, 2001 UT App 13
at ^[17 (citations omitted). In this case, this Court should reverse because the trial court's
refusal to give instruction 50 prejudiced Carter by insufficiently advising the jury of the
law, thereby misleading the jury as to the merits of Carter's defense. Id.
In order to prove Carter guilty of tax evasion and filing a false tax return, the State
had to prove he had an intent to evade. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-1101(1 )(c), (l)(d).
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Carter's defense was that he did not have an intent to evade; rather, he acted under a
strongly-held belief that he did not owe any state income tax because state taxable
income is calculated based on federal taxable income and, according to his personal
reading of the federal tax code, he did not have any federal taxable income. R. 274:1920, 58-63, 96-100, 110, 118, 120-21, 167-69. In other words, Carter's defense rested on
his interpretation of tax law. Id. The more outrageous his interpretation, the more likely
the jury would conclude he was cleverly attempting to evade taxes rather than standing
by the strongly-held conviction he professed. Id, By failing to instruct the jury that the
first prong of Carter's defense, that state taxable income is calculated based on federal
taxable income, was an accurate statement of the law, the trial court left the impression
that this prong of Carter's defense was premised on a false interpretation of tax law. Id.;
see Jensen, 835 P.2d at 969.
This, in turn, prejudiced Carter by making his interpretation of tax law appear
significantly more outrageous, thereby making it appear more likely his defense was
simply a clever attempt to evade taxes rather than the result of a strongly-held belief that
he did not owe any state income tax. Cf. Hales Sand & Gravel Inc. v. Audit Division of
the State Tax Comm'n, 842 P.2d 887, 895 (Utah 1992) (holding "taxpayer can escape the
penalty if he or she can show that he or she based the nonpayment of taxes on a
legitimate, good faith interpretation of an arguable point of law" (citing Chicago Bridge
& Iron Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 839 P.2d 303, 309 (Utah 1992)); Vermaxof Fla. v.
Utah State Tax Comm'n, 906 P.2d 314, 317 (Utah Ct. App. 1995).
Moreover, the prejudice Carter suffered was not lessened by the fact that the
16

State's witness stated during cross-examination that a person cannot "have state taxable
income" if he "has no federal taxable income." R. 274:97. Carter was entitled to have
the legal principles on which his defense relied presented to the jury as binding principles
of law rather than merely as statements of evidence the jury was free to disregard. See
Bluff, 2002 UT 66 at ^21 ("A defendant has the right to present his or her theory of the
case to the jury and to have the jury instructed accordingly."); R. 274:140 (trial court
instructing jury it has "duty to instruct you on the law and you are bound to follow it");
274:157 (trial court informing jury that it "has endeavored to give you instructions
embodying all rules of law that may be necessary in guiding you to a just and lawful
verdict"). He was also entitled to have the legal principles on which he relied clearly
stated in the instructions rather than lost in the presentation of evidence. See Alonzo, 932
P.2d at 615 (holding defendant has right to have his "'theory of the case presented to the
jury in a clear and understandable way'" (citation omitted)).
ARGUMENTS PRESENTED BY PRO SE DEFENDANT6
Point #1. The trial court abused it's discretion when it refused to give some of my
proposed jury instructions. This failure shows bias against me, on the part of the court,
and constitutes prejudicial error.
A. The trial court erred in denying my proposed jury instruction, which explained
that state income tax liability is triggered by a person earning state taxable income, & not

6

See supra note 2, herein.
See addendum C for a signed copy of Carter's written arguments. His arguments were
copied into the text of this brief in order to comply with the rules and for ease of the

7
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triggered by someone who just earns wages that are not state taxable income, (see
transcript, page 73 line 6 through page 74 line 15.)
I believe the court further showed prejudice against me and against Utah Code, in
comments made on page 74 lines 14 &15 of the court transcript, where the judge stated "I
see no distinction between wages and income. Forty-nine is denied."
Utah Code Section 59-10-112 defines state taxable income as: "State taxable
income5 in the case of resident individual means his federal taxable income. . ." See Utah
Code Ann. § 59-10-112. If state taxable income was defined simply as wages, salaries &
tips earned in the state of Utah, I would never have stopped paying them. It is because of
this definition and the fact that state income taxes are totally dependent upon federal
taxable income, (see also Utah Code Section 59-10-102(1)), that I stopped paying state
income taxes.
B. The trial court erred in denying my jury instruction which explained that the
prosecution had to prove that I knew that I was liable for payment of state income taxes,
but sought to intentionally evade them.
Point #2. The trial court abused its discretion when it denied my pre-trial motion to
dismiss. This failure shows bias against me, on the part of the court and constitutes
prejudicial error.
A. The judge informed me that she did not have a copy of my motion to dismiss
and indicated to me that she had never even read it. She denied my motion to dismiss
having not even read it. This is at least partially preserved in the transcript of my motion
Court.
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to dismiss hearing, on page 6 lines 16 through 22.
Point #3. Utah Code places the determination of what constitutes state taxable
income, outside of state jurisdiction by defining state taxable income as federal taxable
income. (Utah Code Section 59-10-112.)
Point #4. My Constitutional right to due process has been violated, since the court
and the prosecution assumed that I am liable for federal income taxes. At no point in
time has it been demonstrated to me, and it was never demonstrated to the jury, that there
is any law that created or creates an income tax liability on me, for federal income tax
purposes.
This would be necessary because of the fact that Utah Code Section 59-10-102(1)
clearly establishes that the intent of the Utah tax code is: uto impose on each resident
individual, estate, or trust for each taxable year a tax measured by the amount of his
'taxable income' for such year, as determined for federal income tax purposes,. .."
Point #5. The prosecution introduced a "certificate of lack of records" that they claimed
they received from the IRS which said that the IRS could not locate federal income tax
returns from me, for tax years 2001, 2002, & 2003. I had no prior warning that the state
would alledge that I hadn't filed federal returns for these years, otherwise I would have
had hard evidence with me, to prove that I not only did in fact file returns for these years,
but that the IRS did in fact receive returns for those years as well. The introduction of
this deceitful document may have destroyed my credibility in the eyes of the jurors and
convinced them to find me guilty, even though I did in fact file a federal return for each
of those 3 years, (see court transcript, page 134 lines 9-13.)
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CONCLUSION
For the above enumerated reasons, Carter respectfully requests that this Court
reverse and remand for a new trial.

SUBMITTED t h i s < ^ ^ d a y of May, 2006.

JOSIE E. BRUMFIELD u
Standby Counsel for Defendant/Appellant.
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State, 5th Floor, P.O. Box 140230, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0230, and four copies to
the Utah Attorney General's Office, Heber M. Wells Building, 160 East 300 South, 6th
Floor, P.O. Box 140854, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854, t h i s ^ ^ day of May, 2006.

JOgE E. BRUMFIELD

U

DELIVERED to the Utah Court of Appeals and the Utah Attorney General's
Office as indicated above this

day of May, 2006.
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ADDENDUM A

3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

MINUTES
HEARING
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT

vs.

Case No: 041905901 FS

DANIEL L CARTER,
Defendant,
Custody: USP

Judge:
Date:

LESLIE A LEWIS
November 18, 2005

PRESENT
Clerk:
chells
Prosecutor: BAER, MARK W
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): SIKORA, MICHAEL R
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Date of birth: June 22, 1971
Video
CHARGES
TAX EVASION
Plea: Not
TAX EVASION
Plea: Not

- 3rd Degree Felony
Guilty - Disposition: 06/27/2005 Guilty
- 2nd Degree Felony
Guilty - Disposition: 06/27/2005 Guilty

HEARING
The Court orders Mr Carter to pay $10,125.00 restitution, $400.00
recoupment fee, $2,500.00 fine plus interest/surcharge.
The Court orders Mr Carter has remained indigent and was
previously determined to be indigent.
The Court orders the Legal Defendars Office is appointed to
represent Mr Carter for the purposes of appeal.

Case No: 041905901
Date:
Nov 18, 2005
SENTENCE PRISON
Based on the defendant's conviction of TAX EVASION a 3rd Degree
Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not
to exceed five years in the Utah State Prison.
Based on the defendant's conviction of TAX EVASION a 2nd Degree
Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not
less than one year nor more than fifteen years in the Utah State
Prison.
To the SALT LAKE County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the
defendant will be confined.
SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE
Count 2 is to run concurrent with count 1.
SENTENCE RECOMMENDATION NOTE
Credit for time served of 64 days.

SENTENCE FINE
Charge # 1

Fine:
Suspended:
Surcharge:
Due:

$2500.00
$0.00
$2125.00
$4625.00

Charge # 2
Total Fine
Total Suspended
Total Surcharge
Total Principal Due
Attorney Fees
Pay in behalf of

$2500.00
$0
$2125.00
$4625.00
Plus Interest
Amount: $400.00 Plus Interest
LDA

Case No: 041905901
Date:
Nov 18, 2 005
Restitution
Amount: $10125.00
Pay in behalf of: UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION
Pay fine to The Court.
Dated this

\f)

day of

//2o 0^ . <~ y 2
LESLIE A LEWIS
^<r
District Court Judge

,<y ......... ys\

-^
Of

xV /
*********

CUSTODY
The defendant is remanded to the custody of the Department of
Corrections at the Utah State Prison for incarceration.

>N

Vf
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ADDENDUM B

U.S. CONSTITUTION
AMENDMENTS

A m e n d . XIV, § 3

AMENDMENT XIV
Section
1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal
protection ]
2. [Representatives — Power to reduce appointment.]
3. [Disqualification to hold office.]

Section
4. [Public debt not to be questioned — Debts of
the Confederacy and claims not
to be paid.]
5. [Power Unenforce amendment.]

Section 1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — E q u a l
protection.]
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

UTAH CONSTITUTION
Sec. 7. [Due process of law.]
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process
of law.

UTAH CODE ANN. §5940-112
KilQ-112- State taxable income of resident individual.
"State taxable income" in the case of a resident individual means his federal
M^blf income (as defined by Section 59-10-111) with the modifications,
ffiVactions, and adjustments provided in Section 59-10-114. The state
^p&li income of a resident individual who is the beneficiary of an estate or
tlrusfshall be modified by the adjustments provided in Section 59-10-209.
JKstory: L. 1973, ch. 147, § 11; C. 1953,
P944A-11; renumbered by L. 1987, ch. 2,
Tl73a995 t ch. 345, § 2.

UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-8-1101

PART 11
TAXATION
76-8-1101. Criminal offenses and penalties relating to
revenue and taxation — Statute of limitations.
(1) (a) As provided in Section 59-1-401, criminal offenses and penalties are
as provided in Subsections (1Kb) through (d).
(b) (i) Any person who is required by Title 59 or any laws the State Tax
Commission administers or regulates to register with or obtain a
license or permit from the State Tax Commission, who operates
without having registered or secured a license or permit, or who
operates when the registration, license, or permit is expired or not
current, is guilty of a class B misdemeanor.
(ii) Notwithstanding Section 76-3-301, for purposes of Subsection
(l)(b)(i), the fine may not:
(A) be less t h a n $500; or
(B) exceed $1,000.
(c) (i) Any person who, with intent to evade any tax or requirement of
Title 59 or any lawful requirement of the State Tax Commission, fails
to make, render, sign, or verify any return or to supply any information within the time required by law, or who makes, renders, signs, or
verifies any false or fraudulent return or statement, or who supplies
any false or fraudulent information, is guilty of a third degree felony.
(ii) Notwithstanding Section 76-3-301, for purposes of Subsection
(l)(c)(i), the fine may not:
(A) be less t h a n $1,000; or
(B) exceed $5,000.
(d) (i) Any person who intentionally or willfully attempts to evade or
defeat any tax or the payment of a tax is, in addition to other penalties
provided by law, guilty of a second degree felony.
(ii) Notwithstanding Section 76-3-301, for purposes of Subsection
(l)(d)(i), the fine may not:
(A) be less t h a n $1,500; or
(B) exceed $25,000.
(2) The statute of limitations for prosecution for a violation of this section is
the later of six years.
(a) from the date the tax should have been remitted, or
(b) after the day on which the person commits the criminal offense.
History: C. 1953, 76-8-1101, enacted by L.
1987, ch. 3, ^ 57; 2001, ch. 177, fc 2.
Amendment Notes. — The 2001 amendment, effective July 1, 2001, substituted "required by law" for "required under this title" m
Subsection QKcKi), inserted "intentionally or"

in Subsection (l)(d)d), added "the later of" in
the introductory paragraph in Subsection (2),
added Subsection (2Kb), and redesignated subsections and made related and stylistic
changes
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